RECENT CASES
Depression, 20 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1934); Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246
N.W. 556 (1933).
The practical implications of this decision should be noted. In the case of the
ordinary tax-payer, the hardship of present payment of the tax may be mitigated by
the possibility of introducing the bid in the year when he finally sells the property as a
high cost figure either to establish a loss or to minimize his gain. But see Suncrest
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 375 (1932). But this possibility is not available to the tax-payer in the instant case since life insurance companies are not permitted to include capital gains and losses in their returns. 49 Stat. 1710 (1936); 26
U.S.C.A. § § 202, 203 (1935). Further, insofar as the decision tends to encourage
low bids, it tends to defeat the policy of redemption statutes. Durfee and Doddridge,
Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev.
825 (1925). However, this danger is not too imminent since in most cases the mortgagee may still bid the value of the land and in the case of an insurance company may
bid the full amount of the debt. This decision will very probably not change the practice of bidding less than the value of the land in cases of foreclosure of a bond issue
pursuant to a bondholder's reorganization. Katz, The Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517 (1936). However
to take the bid as conclusive of value will avail to the individual bondholders an unreal
present loss with the possibility of an unreal future gain.
Practice-Federal Jurisdiction-Action for Patent Infringement and Unfair Competition-[Federal].-The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from infringement of his earmuff patent, and from unfair competition consisting in the advertisement and sale by
the defendants of infringing articles. One of the defendants had been a partner of the
plaintiff in the sale of the patented ear-muffs, and on dissolution of the partnership had
agreed not to engage in the business of merchandising such articles in violation of the
plaintiff's patent right. Held, the plaintiff's patent was not valid and consequently no
infringement had occurred. It thus becomes unnecessary to decide the unfair competition charges, for in the absence of diversity of citizenship of the parties, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon the plaintiff's sustaining the patent infringement charges.
Atkins v. Gordon, 86 F. (2d) 595 (C.C.A. 7th 1936).
Sending a plaintiff to a local court when the facts upon which his local claim is based
are already before a federal court supporting his federal claim involves an unnecessary
duplication of effort. It is widely asserted that once a federal court has obtained jurisdiction to decide a federal question, it may adjudicate all closely related questions involved in the case, even though not themselves federal questions. Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 737, 821 (1824); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville .R.
Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 192 (19o9); i Foster, Federal Practice 77 (5th ed. 1913). Application of this principle has led to much confusion, particularly where the same facts
give rise to both a federal claim of patent, trade-mark, or copyright infringement and
a local claim of unfair competition. See 40 Harv. L. Rev. 298 (1926). Some courts have
summarily refused to decide the unfair competition claim in the absence of diversity of
citizenship. Schiebel v. Clark, 217 Fed. 76o (C.C.A. 6th 1914) (patent invalid); Planten
v. Gedney, 224 Fed. 382 (C.C.A. 2d 1915) (trade-mark valid and infringed) ;-Faehndrich v. Riddle Cheese Co., 34 F. (2d) 43 (D.C. N.Y. 1929) (trade-mark valid, not infringed). In other cases courts have decided the unfair competition claim on the merits
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without regard to the outcome of the federal claim. Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F.
(2d) 991 (C.C.A. 6th 1926); Chand,Inc. v. Riviere Perfumes, 8 Fed. Supp. 473 (N.Y.
1934); L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 8 F. Supp. 351 (N.Y. 1934). A third group of
cases permits consideration of the local claim only in computing damages for the federal claim. Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Myers, 25 F. (2d) 659 (C.C.A. 6th 1928); Swanfeldt v.
Waldman, 50 F. (2d) 445 (D.C. Cal. 1931 ) .
The Supreme Court has held that the unfair competition claim may be adjudicated
on the merits irrespective of the decision on the federal claim and of the absence of
diversity of citizenship. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1339
(I933); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 412 (1934); see also, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 480 (1934). The
only distinction between the Hur and the principal case is that in the former the
Court decided that the copyright although valid had not been infringed, whereas in
the latter the patent was held invalid; a distinction which the Supreme Court itself
considered immaterial. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1933). The holding in
the Hum case provides a desirable solution since much evidence and argument relevant to the federal issue will also be relevant to the unfair competition claim; thus
making expedient a decision of the local question, precluding the defendant from raising jurisdictional questions for dilatory purposes, and saving the plaintiff from a burdensome duplication of suits. Probably, however, the Court will require the federal
claim to have been prosecuted in good faith.
The same result could be reached by a broad construction of "cause of action."
Since substantially the same evidence and argument are used to support the infringement and unfair competition claims, the plaintiff may well be considered to have set
out one cause of action which can be disposed of on either or both of two grounds. See
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246, 247 (1933); Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F. (2d)
991, 994, 995 (C.C.A. 6th 1926); Waterman v. Gordon, 8 F. Supp. 351, 353 (N.Y.
1934). Such a definition of "cause of action" would emphasize evidential convenience
rather than traditional analyses of theories of recovery. Clark, Code Pleading 83, 84
(1928). In view of the general controversy over the scope of "cause of action," however, the solution previously suggested provides a less dangerous method of reaching
a desirable result.
Real Property-Ownership of Caves--Subterranean Limits of Land Ownership[Indiana].-The mouth of Marengo cave was discovered in 1883 on the property of the
defendant's predecessor in title. Shortly thereafter the cave was explored and since
that time, it has been exhibited for profit by the owners of its mouth. The plaintiff
purchased a neighboring tract of land in 19o8, and in 1929 brought suit to secure a
survey of the cave and to quiet title to that portion which should be found to extend
under his land. The defendant filed a cross-complaint to quiet title to the whole cave
in his favor. The survey was ordered by the lower court and the plaintiff's claim to the
portion of the cave under his land was sustained. Held, reversed. The defendant has
acquired title by adverse possession. Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 7 N.E. (2d) 59 (Ind.
App. 1937).
Apparently assuming that the rights of ownership in a cave are necessarily in the
owner of the land above it, the court disposed of the adverse possession point according
to accepted authority when it found fulfillment of the orthodox requirements that adverse possession be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous, and under a
claim of right. See 2 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 500-504 (2d ed. 1920). The ignorance

